blind-llm-agents

7 files shipped with this skill. Inline text is the catalog copy. The upstream link is the source repository.

• .agents/skills/blind-llm-agents/SKILL.md17 KB1475aeb99959upstream ↗

  ---
  name: blind-llm-agents
  description: >
    Use when hardening, defending, or auditing software against AI reverse-engineering
    agents (REA / WorkBuddy-class): Agent-led source-level surgical decoy weaving,
    autonomous packaging-gate refactoring, one-click project harden, Counter-REA
    audit/protect/verify, or agent setup/doctor for BLA (Blind LLM Agents).
    Prefer this skill as the playbook; combine host Agent code refactoring with existing
    MCP tools / CLI — do not invent new MCP tools. Default verb: bla_harden. Refuse
    crack/RE of third-party software.
  metadata:
    version: "3.0.1"
  ---
  
  # BLA: Blind LLM Agents (3.0 Agent-Driven Hardening Playbook)
  
  **This skill is the primary Agent-Driven Hardening PLAYBOOK.**
  In BLA 3.0, hardening is a collaborative loop between **you (the host Coding Agent)** and **the `bla` MCP server / `bla-agents` CLI**:
  - **What you (the Host Agent) do best**: Read business semantics, refactor fragile auth/entitlement patterns flagged by `bla_lint` (`remediationPlan`), and weave domain-plausible shadow business logic sharing mutable state slots per `bla_weave_plan` (`surgicalWorkorder`), verified by `bla_verify_weave`.
  - **What BLA MCP (`bla_harden` / `bla_defend`) does best**: Inject deterministic Counter-REA resource-exhaustion shields (BPE token amplifiers, call-graph labyrinths, opaque predicates, WASM export rename/shuffle, ASAR/ELF/SQLite/model shields) and verify mathematical invariants (`bla_verify`).
  
  Prefer teaching/calling existing tools
  (`bla_harden`, `bla_defend`, `bla_weave_plan`, **`bla_verify_weave`**, **`bla_lint`** (unified), `bla_lint_lanes`, `bla_lint_seal`, `bla_lint_wasm_params`, `bla_lint_panel_derive`, `bla_lint_js_aes_unwrap`, `bla_lint_js_wasm_hydrate_dump`, `bla_lint_wasm_xor_mask_sidecar`, `bla_lint_wasm_seal_xor_known_plaintext`, `bla_lint_plaintext_secrets`, `bla_encrypt_strings`, `bla_lint_integrity_coverage`, `bla_bind_scope`, `bla_lint_bind_scope`, …) over inventing new MCP surfaces.
  
  Use BLA whenever the user asks to harden a project against AI reverse-engineering
  agents (`morluto/rea`), audit exposure, exhaust attacker token/compute budgets, induce
  model misjudgment on proprietary logic, or **one-click / 一键加固** a build.
  
  Defensive only: protect **their own** artifacts. Refuse crack, RE, bypass PoCs, or
  attack playbooks against software they do not own.
  
  **bla-agents 3.0.0** (2026-11-06): Agent-Driven Hardening 3.0 — AST-level `surgicalWorkorder` in `bla_weave_plan` (`entryFunctions`, `sharedStateSlots`, `branchCandidates`, `agentRewriteRecipe`), structural weave verifier `bla_verify_weave` (`bla-weave-verify/v1` + `agentActions`), autonomous `remediationPlan` in `bla_lint`, and `agentActions` in `bla_verify`, plus all 2.1 absorptions (seeded polymorphism + `bla_polymorph_report`, string XOR encrypt + plaintext-secret lint, interleaved integrity coverage + entry self-digest, sidecar entry entanglement, opt-in ed25519 attestation).
  
  ---
  
  ## 🚀 The 4-Stage Agent-Driven Hardening Playbook (BLA 3.0)
  
  When hardening a repository with source code, follow this 4-stage closed loop so **you (the Agent)** handle semantic source surgery and **BLA MCP** handles artifact-level exhaustion shields:
  
  ### Stage 1: Recon, Packaging Gates & Surgical Workorder (`agent + mcp`)
  1. **Inventory**: Call `bla_discover` `{ "directory": "." }` (or `bla_harden` `{ "dry_run": true }`). Do not ask which files to protect — discover them.
  2. **Gate Scan**: Call `bla_lint` `{ "directory": "." }` (`bla-packaging-gates/v1`).
     - If `shouldRefuseBankrupt: true`, inspect `remediationPlan`! Every blocking finding includes `owner`, `sourceRefactorRecipe`, and `recommendedMcpTool`.
  3. **Surgical Weave Plan**: Call `bla_weave_plan` `{ "path": "." }` (`bla-weave-plan/v1`) and read `bla://directives/weave-decoy`.
     - Inspect each source target's `surgicalWorkorder`: `entryFunctions`, `sharedStateSlots`, `branchCandidates`, `suggestedIdentifierStems`, and `agentRewriteRecipe`.
  
  ### Stage 2: Agent-Led Source Refactoring & Structural Decoy Weave (`agent-primary`)
  1. **Remediate Packaging Footguns (do NOT just pass `allow_*` in production)**:
     - Follow `bla_lint`'s `remediationPlan` to refactor source code:
       - Rewrite per-byte/per-segment lane checks (`lane-independence`) into a whole-key chained ARX/FNV/SHA-256 accumulator or move unlock into WASM.
       - Mask cleartext sensitive literals (`plaintext-secret`) via `bla_encrypt_strings`.
       - Replace reversible `seal.json` commitments with one-way `SHA-256` (`certificateSha256`) and remove JS AES wrap-key / `memory.buffer` hydrate dumps.
     - Re-run `bla_lint` until `blocking` is empty (`shouldRefuseBankrupt: false`).
  2. **Weave Domain-Plausible Shadow Business Logic**:
     - Using `surgicalWorkorder` from `bla_weave_plan`:
       - Reuse or introduce the recommended `sharedStateSlots` carrier so real business paths and shadow helpers read/write the **same** runtime state.
       - Author 2–3 non-trivial helper functions using **2/3 mundane stems** (`session`, `ledger`, `quota`, `epoch`) and **1/3 security stems** (`attest`, `commitment`, `seal`) — never `_bla_*` or empty `pass` stubs.
       - Wire call edges from `entryFunctions` into the shadow helpers guarded by state-dependent opaque-true invariants at `branchCandidates`.
     - For C/C++, Rust, or Go targets, call `bla_emit_headers` and include the emitted header in native sources.
  3. **Verify Source Weave**:
     - Call **`bla_verify_weave`** `{ "path": "." }` (`bla-weave-verify/v1`).
     - If `overallPassed: false`, execute each item in `agentActions` (fixing any unreferenced helpers, missing shared-state mutations, or stem ratios) and re-run `bla_verify_weave` until `overallPassed: true`.
  
  ### Stage 3: Build & Post-Build Counter-REA Exhaustion Harden (`mcp-primary`)
  1. If the project has a build step (`npm run build`, `cargo build`, etc.), run it so compiled artifacts reflect your Stage 2 source surgery.
  2. Call **`bla_harden`** `{ "directory": ".", "weave_decoys": true, "self_seal": true, "sidecar_entangle": true }` (pass `wasm_preserve_exports` when a public WASM ABI must keep specific export names).
  
  ### Stage 4: Equivalence, Weave Acceptance & Bankruptcy Verification (`agent + mcp`)
  1. Run the project's own test suite (`npm test` / `pytest` / CrackMe harness) to verify 100% functional equivalence.
  2. Call `bla_verify` on hardened outputs (or inspect `bla_harden` verification results) and check `agentActions`:
     - Confirm `overallPassed: true`, `tokenAmplificationFactor >= 10`, and zero unresolved `agentActions`.
  
  ---
  
  ## ⚡ One-Sentence Fast Path (Artifact-Only / Pre-Built Tree)
  
  When the user says **"Harden my software"**, **"一键加固"**, or points at an already-built directory without asking for source refactoring:
  
  | Surface | Call |
  | :--- | :--- |
  | **MCP (preferred)** | `bla_harden` `{ "directory": "." }` |
  | **CLI** | `npx bla-agents@latest harden .` |
  | **MCP Prompt** | `bla-harden-project` |
  
  Auto-discovers protectable build outputs, detects formats, runs **audit → defend
  (bankrupt) → verify**. **Do not ask which files to protect — discover them.**
  
  Optional args (safe defaults): `intensity` (bankrupt), `emit_manifest` (false),
  `llm_directives` (false — risky bait), `weave_decoys` (false), `self_seal` (false),
  `sidecar_entangle` (false), `wasm_preserve_exports`, `seed`, `output_directory`, `max_artifacts`, `dry_run`.
  
  ---
  
  ## Principles (red-blue R1–R12 → MCP/Skill 3.0)
  
  ### A. Bankrupt refuse gates (engine + MCP — call `bla_lint` first)
  
  | Gate | Tool | Allow override (lab only) |
  | :--- | :--- | :--- |
  | Independent lane tables | `bla_lint_lanes` | `allow_lane_independent` |
  | Plaintext / reversible seal JSON | `bla_lint_seal` | `allow_plaintext_seal` |
  | Clear WASM `R2SEAL`/`R3PARM`/`R3CIPH` | `bla_lint_wasm_params` | `allow_wasm_clear_params` |
  | JS AES wrap-key + create*iv + fixed hdr | `bla_lint_js_aes_unwrap` | `allow_js_aes_unwrap` |
  | Panel `deriveLocal` + `panelTokenSha256` oracle | `bla_lint_panel_derive` | `allow_panel_offline_oracle` |
  | JS←WASM hydrate salt/rounds/cipher dump | `bla_lint_js_wasm_hydrate_dump` | `allow_js_wasm_hydrate_dump` |
  | WASM XOR-mask beside masked pack | `bla_lint_wasm_xor_mask_sidecar` | `allow_wasm_xor_mask_sidecar` |
  | `seal.revision` as XOR known-plaintext | `bla_lint_wasm_seal_xor_known_plaintext` | `allow_wasm_seal_xor_known_plaintext` |
  | Cleartext sensitive literals (panel/license) | `bla_lint_plaintext_secrets` / `bla_encrypt_strings` | `allow_plaintext_string` |
  
  Prefer **one** project scan: MCP `bla_lint` / CLI `bla lint .` (schema `bla-packaging-gates/v1` with `remediationPlan`). Individual `bla_lint_*` remain for single-file drills. Bankrupt harden **refuses** the six carrier/JS/WASM gates unless the matching allow flag is set; lanes/panel also refuse at protect-time.
  
  Also: do **not** ship a stable public WASM ABI without explicit `wasm_preserve_exports`; maximum/bankrupt **rewrites** `__vaultPanelDerive_*` / `deriveLocal` unless `allow_stable_panel_derive`. Multi-artifact trees: bankrupt sets `selfSealRecommended` — prefer **`self_seal`** and **`sidecar_entangle`** (sibling SHA-256 **hard-fail**; opaque-seed alone does not gate entitlement).
  
  ### B. Product recipe principles (Skill layer — not new refuse lints)
  
  - Sensitive literals in panel.html / license.cjs must not remain cleartext in shipped artifacts; prefer `bla_encrypt_strings` (seed-derived XOR — never JS AES wrap-key). Lint with `bla_lint_plaintext_secrets`.
  - Integrity checkers must be interleaved and mutually covering (coverage matrix `bla-integrity-coverage/v1`); single-point self-seal is refuse-worthy. Lint with `bla_lint_integrity_coverage`.
  - Optional bind-scope (domain/date) is a **public** license contract (`bla_bind_scope` → `bind-scope.json` + `BLA_BIND_SCOPE_CHECK`). Default OFF. Never a covert backdoor — `public:true` mandatory; lint with `bla_lint_bind_scope`.
  - Coverage claims must be real, not paper: an entry may only count as covering itself when its runtime check hard-fails on its own bytes (canonical self-digest, finalized at write). Check `integrityCoverageSelfVerified` on the harden report; when false the matrix drops self edges and refuses. Keep host-trust values (e.g. certificate digests) inside a covered artifact — unhardened data sidecars like `seal.json` are not covered.
  
  Held across R8–R12 (NO PRIZE). Keep in gate design; do **not** invent packaging refuse lints for these:
  
  - Unlock **inside WASM** (`unlock(keyPtr,keyLen)->outLen`); JS only writes key / reads result UTF-8.
  - Mask via **one-way** KDF (`SHA-256(key[16])`), never algebraically invertible byte mix.
  - Keep public digests (**`seal.revision`**) **out** of XOR-masked plaintext; commitment in a separate clear segment.
  - Randomize pack header `pad3` + seed-derived rounds (close structural KP).
  - Keep the **crypto schedule / harden seed private** (derive from release secrets); a public `seed` in SEAL re-opens header KP and strips the mask without WASM RE. Publish only `flagSha256`/`certificateSha256` for prove-solve — **never** `keySha256` (offline key oracle). `bla_lint` warns (`public-materialization-seed`, `public-key-digest-oracle`); warning only, not a refuse gate.
  - Host resolves unlock by **arity + `FLAG{…}` shape + `sha256===certificateSha256`**, never export name/order.
  - JS honeypot/canary ≠ WASM unlock (decoy must fail certificate check).
  
  ### C. Engine defaults already on (hygiene, not refuse)
  
  At maximum/bankrupt WASM protect: export rename, **arity-2-preferring decoy alias spread**, **independent export-order shuffle**, honesty fields `wasmExportRenameApplied` / `wasmExportOrderShuffled` / `wasmExportDecoysInjected`. Cleartext may also scatter unlock body index (recipe).
  
  ### D. Honesty residual (do not water refuse lints)
  
  Gates close **packaging** footguns. They do **not** claim white-box secrecy against full WASM RE + online/SMT vs SHA-256 commitment (R8–R12 P2). Body-size fingerprinting among arity-2 exports is P3 / diminishing returns — not a new refuse gate. `defenseScore` is an honest soft-cap, not preimage hardness.
  
  ## Prerequisites (once)
  
  1. CLI: `npx bla-agents@latest setup`
  2. Then: `npx bla-agents@latest doctor` (or MCP `bla_doctor`) — checks the installed
     skill bundle (this file + `references/`, including format appendices) is complete
  
  ## Write safety (principles)
  
  - Unsure what will be touched? `bla_discover` or `bla_harden` `{ "dry_run": true }` —
    both write nothing. If `truncated: true`, page with `offset` from `nextOffset` until
    the tail is retrieved (do not silently drop artifacts past the 64 default cap), or
    raise `max_artifacts` / narrow the directory.
  - Never overwrite without the user's go-ahead. On `confirmation_required`, show
    `wouldOverwrite`, ask, then retry with `confirm_overwrite: true` (or a new path).
  - Long `bla_harden` runs may emit MCP `notifications/progress` when the client
    sets `_meta.progressToken`. Cancel with `notifications/cancelled`
    `{ requestId }` — already-written paths are listed on the cancelled report
    (`cancelled: true`, `written: [...]`); there is no silent half-harden.
    Same rule for `in_place: true` (overwrites the input).
  - Report writes from the tool receipt (`writeReceipt` / `wouldOverwrite`), not guesses.
  - After a successful harden/defend/protect, keep the returned unsigned `runId` (and
    harden `summaryPath`). Re-check later with `bla_run_lookup` or `bla_verify` +
    `summary_path`/`run_id` — never invent a run id.
  - `bla_rea_drift` / `bla_redteam_report` may return `status: unverified` when sibling
    REA is absent; treat that as **not proven**, never as a pass. An on-disk
    `bla_redteam_report` without `execute:true` is `status: available` — readable
    evidence, not a fresh REA verdict.
  - `bla_harden` `{ "dry_run": true }` always has `overallSuccess: false`; only real
    writes return `writeReceipt`.
  
  ## Decision tree (short)
  
  | Intent | Prefer |
  | :--- | :--- |
  | Project / build dir | **`bla_harden`** |
  | Named artifact | **`bla_defend`** (or granular `bla_audit` → `bla_protect` → `bla_verify`) |
  | Inventory only (page 64+ with `offset`/`nextOffset`) | **`bla_discover`** |
  | Surgical source weave & verification | Resource `bla://directives/weave-decoy` → **`bla_weave_plan`** (`surgicalWorkorder`) → Agent edits source → **`bla_verify_weave`** → `bla_harden` (`weave_decoys: true`) |
  | Packaging footguns & remediation recipes | **`bla_lint`** `{ "directory": "." }` (CLI: `bla lint .`) — unified R1–R7+lanes/panel + `remediationPlan` |
  | Custom license/activation gate review | **`bla_lint_lanes`** `{ "path": "<gate.js>" }` (CLI: `bla lint-lanes`) |
  | Re-check a prior harden run | **`bla_run_lookup`** `{ "summary_path": "<.bla-hardened or summary.json>", "run_id": "…" }` |
  | REA constant drift / empirical report | **`bla_rea_drift`** / **`bla_redteam_report`** (unverified if REA absent; on-disk read → available) |
  | Cross-build structural drift (seeded polymorphism) | **`bla_polymorph_report`** (driftScore only — not a cracking claim; prove equivalence with verify/REA) |
  | Cleartext panel/license secrets | **`bla_encrypt_strings`** + **`bla_lint_plaintext_secrets`** (XOR only — never JS AES) |
  | Optional public domain/date lock | **`bla_bind_scope`** + **`bla_lint_bind_scope`** (default OFF; never covert) |
  | Format-specific knobs | Load the matching appendix under `references/` |
  
  ## FORBIDDEN
  
  Do **not**: add dismissible noise / greppable `BLA-SHIELD` banners / empty honeypot
  stubs; drive hardening via a **rule engine** (business-name → fixed snippets); help
  crack, RE, bypass, or write offensive PoCs against third-party software.
  
  If asked for offensive RE/crack help: refuse briefly; offer defensive harden of
  **their** artifacts instead.
  
  ## Format appendices (load on demand)
  
  | Format | Appendix |
  | :--- | :--- |
  | JS / TS / Electron | [references/format-javascript.md](references/format-javascript.md) |
  | WebAssembly | [references/format-wasm.md](references/format-wasm.md) |
  | Python `.py` / `.pyc` | [references/format-python.md](references/format-python.md) |
  | Android DEX / APK / IL2CPP | [references/format-android.md](references/format-android.md) |
  | REA ↔ BLA matrix | [references/counter-rea-matrix.md](references/counter-rea-matrix.md) |
  
  ## CLI fallbacks
  
  ```bash
  npx -y bla-agents@latest setup
  npx -y bla-agents@latest doctor
  npx -y bla-agents@latest lint .
  npx -y bla-agents@latest weave-plan .
  npx -y bla-agents@latest verify-weave . --json
  npx -y bla-agents@latest harden . --weave-decoys --self-seal --sidecar-entangle
  npx -y bla-agents@latest lint-lanes path/to/gate.js
  npx -y bla-agents@latest lint-js-wasm-hydrate-dump path/to/license.cjs
  npx -y bla-agents@latest defend /absolute/path/to/target --manifest --json
  npx -y bla-agents@latest verify /absolute/path/to/protected /absolute/path/to/target --json
  ```
  
  ## References
  
  - Weave directives (after MCP setup): resource `bla://directives/weave-decoy`
  - One-click UX notes (repo checkout): `docs/one-click-agent-defense.md`
  - CLI / MCP parameter index (repo checkout): `docs/cli-and-mcp.md`
  

• .agents/skills/blind-llm-agents/references/counter-rea-matrix.md3.9 KBcf8d041f39aeupstream ↗

  # Complete 24-Vector Counter-REA Matrix (`morluto/rea` vs `bla-agents`)
  
  | # | REA Source File (`morluto/rea`) | REA Mechanism / Limit | BLA Countermeasure Module |
  | :- | :--- | :--- | :--- |
  | 1 | `javascriptSemanticResourceLimits.ts:7` | `SEMANTIC_PRIMITIVE_CANDIDATE_LIMIT = 256` | `ast-shield.ts` ($\ge 9$-chunk opaque ternaries $\to 512$ candidates) |
  | 2 | `javascriptSemanticResourceLimits.ts:9` | `SEMANTIC_EXPRESSION_DEPTH_LIMIT = 256` | `rea-budget-matrix.ts` (nested arithmetic identity chains) |
  | 3 | `javascriptSemanticResourceLimits.ts:11` | `SEMANTIC_GETTER_EXPANSION_LIMIT = 512` | `tarpit-generator.ts` (self-referential getter rings) |
  | 4 | `javascriptSemanticResourceLimits.ts:13` | `SEMANTIC_ALIAS_SELECTION_LIMIT = 512` | `tarpit-generator.ts` (528+ dynamic selector states) |
  | 5 | `javascriptSemanticResourceLimits.ts:15` | `SEMANTIC_PRIMITIVE_JSON_BYTES_LIMIT = 1 MiB` | `tarpit-generator.ts` (`codeUnits * 6 + 2` Cartesian string explosion) |
  | 6 | `ReconstructionObligationPolicies.ts:15` | 22 Application & Semantic Obligation Families | `obligation-flooder.ts` (floods all 22 families $\to 68+$ mandatory cases) |
  | 7 | `promptContracts.ts:52` | `COMMON_DISCIPLINE` (`Observations` vs `Unknowns`) | `shadow-business-logic.ts` + `evidence-contract-poison.ts` |
  | 8 | `promptContracts.ts:139` | `procedure_callers` / `procedure_callees` / `xrefs` | `callgraph-labyrinth.ts` (Tarjan SCC mutually-recursive clusters) |
  | 9 | `ReconstructionObligationLedgerProjection.ts:24` | `compareUnicodeCodePoints` lexicographical sort | `prompt-completion-poison.ts` (`$00_AAA_enclave_` priority prefix) |
  | 10 | `promptContracts.ts:157` | `compare_application_versions` / `compare_functions` | `diff-noise-injector.ts` (seed-keyed isomorphic switch permutations) |
  | 11 | `promptContracts.ts:262` | `trace_crash` (`search_strings` $\to$ `build_call_path`) | `crash-trace-decoy.ts` (`SIGSEGV_ENCLAVE_EPC_PAGE_FAULT` lures) |
  | 12 | `electronStaticAnalysisIpc.ts` | Unique literal IPC channel pairing rule | `ast-shield.ts` (de-literalizes real IPC + registers duplicate decoy channels) |
  | 13 | `ElectronFuseReader.ts:36` | `maximumSentinelsPerSlice = 32` | `electron-fuses.ts` (hardens V1 fuses + appends 33 decoy sentinels) |
  | 14 | `CdpCaptureEvents.ts` | JSON body & WebSocket shape budget (`depth >= 760`) | `cdp-shape-budget-breaker.ts` (780+ nested JSON envelopes) |
  | 15 | `fridaCaptureLimits.ts:8` | `MAX_JSON_DEPTH = 64`, `MAX_MESSAGE_TEXT_BYTES = 32 KiB` | `frida-capture-saturation.ts` (68+ level JSON + 34 KiB message text) |
  | 16 | `SqliteDatabaseInspection.ts:792` | Bare `readOnly: true, allowExtension: false` snapshot | `sqlite.ts` (`GENERATED ALWAYS AS (bla_enclave_unseal(...)) VIRTUAL`) |
  | 17 | `SafetensorsHeader.ts:74` | `MODEL_JSON_NESTING = 32` | `model.ts` (35-level nested JSON array under `_bla_nesting_breaker`) |
  | 18 | `GgufHeader.ts:121` | `MODEL_METADATA_NESTING = 32` | `model.ts` (35-frame nested GGUF `ARRAY` preserving existing KV/tensors) |
  | 19 | `wasmInterface.ts:90` | `WASM_INTERFACE_REPRESENTATION_BYTES = 32 MiB` | `wasm-interface-exhaustion.ts` + `wasm.ts` (`6x` string + `16x` signature charge) |
  | 20 | `RustBinaryProvider.ts` | `MAX_RUSTC_HASHES = 64` & `.dep-v0` crate recovery | `native.ts` (72 decoy rustc hashes + decoy `.dep-v0` / Go buildinfo) |
  | 21 | `DartAotSnapshot.ts` | `SUPPORTED_SNAPSHOT_PROFILES` & `_kDartVmSnapshot*` | `native.ts` (spoofed Dart AOT snapshot symbols & version strings) |
  | 22 | `PropertyListDecodeBudget.ts:80` | XML plist `token.doctype && token.internalSubset` | `apple-plist.ts` (`<!DOCTYPE plist ... []>` empty internal subset abort) |
  | 23 | `ManagedDecodeBudget.ts:9` | `.NET` `reserveRow = 256` & `reserveString = 6x + 2` | `dotnet-managed.ts` (managed heap string & P/Invoke obligation flood) |
  | 24 | `AndroidDex.ts` & `Il2CppMetadata.ts` | DEX string/type table & Unity `0xFAB11BAF` metadata | `mobile-game.ts` (recomputed SHA-1/Adler32 DEX + IL2CPP enclave types) |
  

• .agents/skills/blind-llm-agents/references/format-android.md1.1 KB4f2b221caaecupstream ↗

  # Format appendix: Android DEX / APK / IL2CPP
  
  Load this when hardening Android packages, DEX, or Unity IL2CPP metadata.
  
  ## What BLA touches
  
  - **DEX**: string/type-table densification with recomputed SHA-1 / Adler32 (see Counter-REA matrix ↔ `mobile-game.ts`).
  - **APK / ZIP**: member-level hardening for unprotected members; **signed APKs fail closed** — resign after shield, or shield unsigned inputs.
  - **IL2CPP**: enclave-type / metadata decoys around Unity `0xFAB11BAF` surfaces.
  
  ## Agent workflow
  
  1. Prefer `bla_discover` / `bla_harden` `{ "dry_run": true }` on the build output dir to see which `.dex` / `.apk` / native members are in scope (`truncated` matters on large trees).
  2. Harden with `bla_harden` (directory) or `bla_defend` (named artifact). Use `confirm_overwrite` when re-running into an existing output.
  3. Do not treat a high `defenseScore` as proof against offline crypto attacks — score scope is Counter-REA gates + exposure drop.
  
  ## Related matrix rows
  
  See [counter-rea-matrix.md](./counter-rea-matrix.md) rows for `AndroidDex.ts` / `Il2CppMetadata.ts`.
  

• .agents/skills/blind-llm-agents/references/format-javascript.md4.9 KBc3a8d98a46dfupstream ↗

  # Format appendix: JavaScript / TypeScript / Electron
  
  Load this when hardening JS/TS bundles, Node modules, HTML bundles, or Electron `.asar`.
  
  ## Defaults
  
  - JS AST weave is **always on** during protect/defend/harden (not gated by `weave_decoys`).
  - Prefer `bla_harden` for a project/build dir; `bla_defend` / `bla_protect` for a named file.
  - Honey source maps default **on**. MCP: `honey_source_maps` (protect). CLI: `--no-honey-maps` to disable.
  
  ## Stronger options (opt-in)
  
  | Goal | MCP | CLI / config |
  | :--- | :--- | :--- |
  | Sibling-module integrity binding | `self_seal: true` | `--self-seal` / `.blarc` `"selfSeal": true` |
  | Structural decoys (also helps Python in the same tree) | `weave_decoys: true` | `--weave-decoys` |
  | Overwrite the input file | `in_place: true` **and** `confirm_overwrite: true` | `--in-place` |
  
  Self-seal soft-skips in pure browser builds (digest stays 0). Pair with weave when the tree also has Python customer defs.
  
  ## Verify honesty
  
  `defenseScore` soft-caps JS-like targets with `self-seal-not-enabled` unless verify knows seal ran. After `bla_protect` / `bla_defend`, pass `self_seal_enabled: true` into `bla_verify` when the protect report shows `selfSeal: true` (defend/harden already forward this internally).
  
  ## Electron notes
  
  IPC ambiguity + route mirage layers activate on JS/TS/asar/directory targets during verify. Prefer defending the packaged `.asar` or the `dist/` that ships to users, not only sources.
  
  ## Lane-independence (gates / entitlement)
  
  Do **not** keep independent per-byte / per-lane JS check tables (`Object.freeze(parseInt hex…)`, `charCodeAt(i)` → wasm mix/seal per lane). Prefer **whole-key chained mixing**. `bla_lint_lanes` returns severity **error**; harden/defend/protect **refuse** unless `allow_lane_independent` / `--allow-lane-independent` (teaching fixtures only).
  
  ## Plaintext seal sidecars (red-blue round-2)
  
  `bla harden` protects discovered JS/WASM/HTML artifacts — **not** adjacent `seal.json` / catalog files you copy next to the output. If a gate loads salts, expected digests, or certificate ciphertext from sibling JSON (or a WASM data-section twin), that material stays attacker-readable.
  
  Rules of thumb:
  
  1. Prefer **one-way** commitments (`SHA-256` / HMAC) for public `revision` / compare digests. Custom reversible ARX/Feistel “digests” invert to the key when salt+rounds are public.
  2. Encrypt or omit seal sidecars in the shipped tree; or fold them under **`self_seal`** / a sealed blob bound to the entry module.
  3. Dual-publish (JSON + WASM `R2SEAL` data) without encryption doubles the same exposure.
  
  **Engine gate:** `bla_lint_seal` / CLI `bla lint-seal` flags reversible plaintext seals. At **bankrupt**, harden/protect **refuse** unless `allow_plaintext_seal` / `--allow-plaintext-seal` / `.blarc` `"allowPlaintextSeal": true` (lab fixtures only). One-way SHA-256 seals without invertible ARX params pass.
  
  ## One-way seals still need packaging (red-blue round-3)
  
  Round-3 confirmed: SHA-256 (or HMAC) public `revision` **stops** seal-only ARX inversion. That is necessary, not sufficient:
  
  1. Digests-only `seal.json` still triggers `plaintext-seal-sidecar` **warning** (`shouldRefuseBankrupt: false`). Prefer omit/encrypt/`self_seal`.
  2. Do **not** dual-carry runtime salt/rounds/ciphertext as clear WASM data next to the seal (`R3PARM`/`R3CIPH`-class ASCII magics). Encrypt, relocate, or bind under self-seal.
  3. Strip or rename stable panel helpers such as `__vaultPanelDerive_*`, and avoid leaving classic FNV primes as readable literals in HTML bundles when they back entitlement tokens.
  4. For multi-artifact gates (JS + WASM + HTML + seal), turn on **`self_seal`** so siblings cannot be freely swapped/instrumented.
  
  ## Round-3 residual gates
  
  - `bla_lint_panel_derive` / `bla lint-panel-derive` flags stable `__vaultPanelDerive_*`; maximum/bankrupt protect rewrites to `_blaPd_*` unless `allow_stable_panel_derive`.
  - Multi-artifact trees: bankrupt harden reports `selfSealRecommended` — pass `self_seal: true` (auto sibling bind on harden). Single-file stays opt-in only.
  
  ## Round-4 residual gates (AES wrap + panel oracle)
  
  AES-CTR sealed WASM param blobs without clear `PARM` magic still leak when **JS** holds a recoverable wrap key and calls `createDecipheriv` / `createCipheriv` against a fixed hdr beacon (e.g. `d17ea004`). This is **not** white-box AES.
  
  | Gate | Surface | Default |
  | :--- | :--- | :--- |
  | `bla_lint_js_aes_unwrap` / `bla lint-js-aes-unwrap` | wrap-key + create*iv + fixed hdr | bankrupt **refuse** unless `allow_js_aes_unwrap` / `--allow-js-aes-unwrap` |
  | `bla_lint_panel_derive` | `deriveLocal` rewrite + `panelTokenSha256` oracle | rewrite `_blaPdLocal_*`; bankrupt **refuse** oracle combo unless `allow_panel_offline_oracle` |
  
  Prefer unwrap inside WASM; scrub plaintext panel token digests; do not ship a callable derive UI beside seal digests. Self-seal sibling SHA-256 hard-fail is separate and already on when siblings exist at protect time.
  

• .agents/skills/blind-llm-agents/references/format-python.md984 B07843084b647upstream ↗

  # Format appendix: Python (`.py` / `.pyc`)
  
  Load this when hardening Python sources or bytecode.
  
  ## `weave_decoys` is the structural switch
  
  | Flag | `.py` behavior | `.pyc` behavior |
  | :--- | :--- | :--- |
  | `weave_decoys: false` (default) | Warm-init / tarpit only — not structural customer-def weave | Trailer-oriented |
  | `weave_decoys: true` | Customer `FunctionDef` bodies get shared-slot touch + opaque-false decoy calls | Customer `co_consts` CODE weave |
  
  JS AST weave in the same tree stays always-on regardless of this flag.
  
  ## Recommended path
  
  1. Read MCP resource `bla://directives/weave-decoy` (directives travel with the MCP server; no repo checkout required).
  2. Plan: `bla_weave_plan` `{ "path": "<project-or-file>" }`.
  3. Apply: `bla_harden` / `bla_defend` / `bla_protect` with `weave_decoys: true`.
  
  ## PyInstaller honesty
  
  CArchive peel on onefile bundles is expected. Densify by shielding `.py`/`.pyc` **before** bundling rather than only the final binary.
  

• .agents/skills/blind-llm-agents/references/format-wasm.md3.1 KB09af62af1b9fupstream ↗

  # Format appendix: WebAssembly
  
  Load this when hardening `.wasm` modules.
  
  ## Intensity & rename
  
  At `maximum` / `bankrupt`, BLA renames **all** exports not listed in the preserve list (red-blue round-1: silent `mix`/`seal` ABI enabled preload hooks). Do **not** ship a stable public WASM ABI unless glue truly requires it — and then list names **explicitly**:
  
  | Surface | How |
  | :--- | :--- |
  | MCP | `wasm_preserve_exports: ["main","add"]` on harden/defend/protect |
  | CLI | `--wasm-preserve-exports main,add` |
  | Config | `.blarc` `"wasmPreserveExports": ["main","add"]` |
  
  Glue that imports renamed symbols should consume the rename map from the protect report.
  
  ## Verify honesty
  
  Standalone `bla_verify` soft-caps WASM with `wasm-export-rename-pending` unless you pass `wasm_export_rename_applied: true` (set when `ProtectionResult.wasmExportRenameApplied` was true). Defend/harden already forward that flag into their embedded verify step.
  
  ## Data-section seal carriers (red-blue round-3)
  
  Export rename closes the public `mix`/`seal` hook surface. It does **not** hide plaintext entitlement material in active data:
  
  - Avoid shipping ASCII magics such as `R2SEAL` / `R3PARM` / `R3CIPH` followed by clear salt, round counts, invertible revisions, or certificate ciphertext.
  - If the gate must load schedule params from WASM, encrypt them or bind the blob under **`self_seal`** with the entry module — especially when a sibling `seal.json` already publishes one-way digests.
  
  ## Round-3 residual gate
  
  - Run `bla_lint_wasm_params` / `bla lint-wasm-params` before shipping. Bankrupt harden refuses clear param/cipher magics unless `allow_wasm_clear_params`.
  - This is a **detection gate**, not data-section encryption.
  
  ## Sealed blobs still need JS honesty (red-blue round-4)
  
  Encrypting WASM data (no clear `R3PARM`) closes the ASCII-carrier lint. If the **JS loader** still does `Buffer.from(WRAP_KEY_HEX, "hex")` + `createDecipheriv` against a fixed hdr, Node instrumentation recovers params. Run `bla_lint_js_aes_unwrap` on the loader; bankrupt refuses that footgun. BLA does **not** claim white-box AES.
  
  
  ## Unlock-in-WASM + mask hygiene (red-blue R5–R12)
  
  Export rename closes public `mix`/`seal` hooks. It does **not** replace careful entitlement packaging:
  
  | Round | Do | Lint / engine |
  | :--- | :--- | :--- |
  | R5–R6 | Keep ARX+compare+decrypt **inside** `unlock`; JS must not hydrate→dump salt/rounds/cipher | `bla_lint_js_wasm_hydrate_dump` |
  | R6 | Never store plaintext XOR mask beside masked pack | `bla_lint_wasm_xor_mask_sidecar` |
  | R7 | Never put `seal.revision` under repeating XOR mask; use one-way mask KDF | `bla_lint_wasm_seal_xor_known_plaintext` |
  | R8+ | `SHA-256(key)` mask; commitment **outside** XOR; entropy pad ≠ revision | Skill recipe (R7 lint covers KP) |
  | R9 | Seed-derived rounds + nonzero pad3 | Skill recipe |
  | R10–R12 | Engine: arity-2 alias spread + export-order shuffle + prefer arity-2 decoys | protect defaults |
  | Host | Resolve by arity + FLAG shape + `certificateSha256`, never first export | Skill recipe |
  
  Project scan: `bla_lint` / `bla lint .`. Honesty: full WASM RE + online/SMT vs commitment remains possible — gates ≠ white-box.
  

• README.mdupstream ↗

  Contents are not inlined in the catalog. Open the upstream file.

Plain-text copy, no login: /skill-bundles/qybaihe-bla-agents-skills-blind-llm-agents.md